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USE OF LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGED 
INFORMATION BY IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THEIR OWN 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ACTIONS UNDER 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
BY DAVID A. DRACHSLER† 
The U.S. Department of Labor has recently blown a big hole in the 
protection for whistleblowers under the federal environmental laws, and in 
so doing has reduced the protection of all of us from environmental haz-
ards. In a recent decision by the Department of Labor Administrative Re-
view Board (“ARB”),1 the ARB held that lawyers employed by corpora-
tions, in-house counsel, may not use any documents or information covered 
by lawyer-client privilege  in claims for illegal retaliation when they blow 
the whistle on their employers’ environmental law violations.2 The ARB’s 
decision ignores the leading cases allowing the use of privileged informa-
tion by in-house counsel in lawsuits brought to seek redress for their illegal 
firing or other discriminatory action,3 as well as a recent American Bar As-
sociation formal opinion on legal ethics addressing this problem.4 
In Willy, a lawyer who was tasked by his employer to head a team to 
visit and review environmental compliance at one of the corporation’s 
plants, and who was an expert on environmental law and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s regulations, wrote a report critical of the com-
pliance status of the plant, pointing out numerous probable violations of 
 
 † David A. Drachsler is a former government attorney who retired in January 2004 after 34 
years with the Department of Labor. Mr. Drachsler is a member of the Virginia Council on Human 
Rights and on the Board of Directors for the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia. 
 1. The ARB speaks with the authority of the Secretary of Labor in administrative litigation under 
those laws enforced by the Department of Labor. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19,978-01 (May 3, 1996) (effective 
upon publication in the Federal Register) (establishing the Administrative Review Board and stating 
“[t]he Administrative Review Board is hereby delegated authority and assigned responsibility to act for 
the Secretary of Labor in issuing final agency decisions on questions of law and fact” pertaining to cer-
tain matters); see also Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 2. Willy v. Coastal Corp., A.R.B. Case No. 98-060 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/DECSN/85caa01q.htm. 
 3. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 4. A.B.A. Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001). 
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law.5 The lawyer was severely chastised for writing the report in that man-
ner and ultimately, he claims, fired for it.6 He filed a complaint with the 
Department of Labor in 1984 under the Clean Air Act, and at the hearing 
introduced a draft copy of the report, over the objection of the corporation, 
as part of his proof of the series of events that culminated in his discharge.7 
The case made its way to the Secretary of Labor who held in 1994 (before 
the establishment of the ARB), that  in-house counsel are entitled to the 
same protections as other employees under the whistleblower provisions of 
the environmental laws, and that they can utilize otherwise privileged in-
formation to vindicate their own rights under those laws, consistent with an 
attorney’s ethical obligations to his client. 
Eight years after the Secretary remanded the case to the Administra-
tive Law Judge to calculate damages due the attorney, the ARB 
reconsidered the question whether it was proper to admit the attorney’s re-
port in evidence, thereby destroying the client’s privilege.8 In February 
2004, the ARB held the document should not have been admitted and, ab-
sent any other evidence of retaliatory intent, dismissed the complaint, 20 
years after it had been filed.9 
In Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc., the Third Circuit held that 
an in-house counsel claiming that she was discharged for opposing her em-
ployer’s alleged discriminatory policies is protected by the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and may, with appro-
priate protections devised by the trial court, utilize attorney-client privi-
leged information to prove her claim.10 In concluding that a house counsel 
is protected by Title VII from retaliation for raising her own discrimination 
claims as well as objecting to the discriminatory treatment of others, the 
Third Circuit agreed with the statement of the Fifth Circuit over ten years 
earlier in Doe v. A Corporation, that “[a] lawyer . . . does not forfeit his 
rights simply because to prove them he must utilize confidential informa-
tion. Nor does the client gain the right to cheat the lawyer by imparting 
confidences to him.”11 The court in Kachmar noted that every other federal 
court that had considered the question whether house counsel may pursue 
 
 5. Willy, ARB Case No. 98-060, at 2. 
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. Id. at 10. 
 8. Id. at 18-19. 
 9. Id. at 36-37. 
 10. 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 11. Id. at 182 (quoting Doe v. A Corp., 749 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
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retaliation claims against their former employers concluded that they 
could.12 
Although the court recognized the important policy embodied in the 
rule of attorney-client confidentiality, the Third Circuit in Kachmar held 
nevertheless that 
In balancing the needed protection of sensitive information with the in-
house counsel’s right to maintain the suit, the district court may use a 
number of equitable measures at its disposal “designed to permit the at-
torney plaintiff to attempt to make the necessary proof while protecting 
from disclosure client confidences subject to the privilege.” Among 
[these protective measures are] “[t]he use of sealing and protective or-
ders, limited admissibility of evidence, orders restricting the use of tes-
timony in successive proceedings, and, where appropriate, in camera 
proceedings.” 13 
The Administrative Review Board misconstrued Kachmar in attempt-
ing to distinguish it. Focusing only on the Third Circuit’s discussion of the 
sometimes subtle distinction between an in-house attorney’s opposition to 
her employer’s policies and her legal advice to the corporation, the ARB 
concluded that Kachmar stands only for the proposition that information 
obtained by an in-house attorney that “did not directly relate to her work as 
an attorney” may be admitted in the attorney’s Title VII retaliation case.14 
If that were the only holding of the case, the court’s discussion of the need 
to balance the attorney’s right to maintain the suit against the need to pro-
tect client confidences, which are “subject to the [attorney-client] privi-
lege,” ’ would have been unnecessary.15 
Moreover, the Administrative Review Board considered none of the 
means of protecting Coastal Corporation’s confidences suggested by the 
court in Kachmar when it dismissed Willy’s complaint. Indeed, a simple 
stipulation that Willy had written the critical memo, without revealing any 
of the specifics of his findings concerning the plant he had reviewed, would 
have been sufficient for him to establish the predicate for his claim of re-
taliation. None of the other evidence necessary for him to carry his burden 
of proof, that retaliation was a motivating factor in his dismissal, would 
have required revealing Coastal’s confidences. 
 
 12. See id. at 179 (citing six discrimination cases that support the notion that “once an attorney’s 
employment has terminated, (s)he is not barred from bringing suit against the former employer for re-
taliatory discharge under Title VII”). 
 13. Id. at 182 (quoting General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994) 
(en banc)). 
 14. Willy v.  Coastal Corp., A.R.B. Case No. 98-060 at 35 (Feb. 27, 2004). 
 15. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 1996) (construing Doe v. A. 
Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1983)) (quoting General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504). 
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On September 22, 2001, the American Bar Association issued a for-
mal opinion entitled   “A Former In-House Lawyer May Pursue a Wrongful 
Discharge Claim Against Her Former Employer and Client as long as Cli-
ent Information Properly is Protected.”16 The opinion pointed out that 
“[t]here is nothing in the Model Rules [of Professional Conduct] that pre-
cludes a lawyer from suing her former client and, in fact, the Rules con-
template that such actions may occur.”17 The Model Rules explicitly pro-
vide that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of 
the client “to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to es-
tablish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client . . . .”18 
The 2001 ABA opinion notes that this was a change from the prior 
Code of Professional Responsibility that limited revelation of client confi-
dences to cases in which the lawyer was seeking to collect his fee or defend 
himself against charges of wrongdoing.19 A number of state rules of profes-
sional conduct have adopted the more recent approach taken by the ABA.20 
But the Administrative Review Board held that it was a breach of an 
attorney’s ethical obligations to his client to use privileged material in his 
own lawsuit against the client, his former employer.21 The ARB relied on 
Weinstein on Evidence and its outmoded distinction between use of client 
confidences defensively, for example, to defend against a charge by the cli-
ent of wrongful conduct by the attorney, and use of privileged information 
in support of affirmative claims by an attorney against his former em-
ployer,22 and completely ignored the more recent ABA opinion and the 
central holding of Kachmar, discussed above. 
 
 16. A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2001). 
 19. See Formal Op. 01-424 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 4-101(C) (1978): “A law-
yer can reveal confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his 
employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.”). 
 20. See e .g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(5) (2002) (“A lawyer may 
reveal confidential information. . . to the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim or establish a 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.” (emphasis added)); 
N. J. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT RPC 1.6(c)(2) (2002); FLA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 (2000); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT ER 1.6(d) (2002) (“A lawyer may reveal such informa-
tion to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.”). 
 21. See Willy v.  Coastal Corp., A.R.B. Case No. 98-060 at 35 (Feb. 27, 2004) (holding that 
“Willy must prove his environmental whistleblower retaliatory discharge complaint, if at all, without 
the use of material protected under the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 22. See id. at 33 (quoting WEINSTEIN’S FED. EVIDENCE § 503-1 (Matthew Bender 2d ed.): “[The 
self-defense exception] is a shield, not a sword.”). 
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Congress’ primary purpose in enacting the environmental whistle-
blower laws was not simply to provide a remedy to courageous employees 
who speak out against environmental hazards caused by their employers.23 
Congress was determined to protect those employees as a means of protect-
ing the environment and the public health and safety from pollutants and 
toxic materials in the nation’s air and water.24 Surely, in-house counsel who 
blow the whistle on threats to public health and safety are entitled to as 
much protection as those who oppose unlawful discriminatory practices. 
By failing to protect an attorney who reports these hazards, the Department 
of Labor undercut this Congressional objective and failed in its responsibil-
ity, through the protection of whistleblowers, to assist in the protection of 
us all from environmental hazards. 
 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 34 (1977). 
 24. Id. 
